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PROUD v. BATES AND OTHERlS.
The lessor of a lease reserved to himself the right to work the mines and quarries
which should be under the premises demised, with the usual wayleave and passage
to, from, and along said premises. The lease contained a covenant on the part of
the lessor that, in working such mines, he should do as little damage and spoil to
the soil as possible.
Held, that lessor was entitled to an absolute right of way underground in working such mines.
Held, also, that in such working the lessor had no right to let down the surface
soil, and that the right to support such surface soil was incident to the grant of the
surface, and could not be taken away, unless by express agreement to that effect.

Tnts was a bill filed by the plaintiff, holding under a lease a
farm granted by the then lord of the manor of Branspeth, in
Durham, against the defendants, who represented the original
lessor, and prayed an injunction to restrain them from carrying
underneath the demised premises coals or other minerals obtained
from adjoining royalties, without the permission of the plaintiff,
and that defendants might be charged with a propei wayleave-reht
fok the use which had been made by them of a way which they
had cut near the demised premises.
The lease was dated the 1st July 1745, and made between William Belasyse of the one part and Williata Darnell of the other
part, whereby, in consideration of Darnell having enclosed certain
lands claimed by said Belasyse, and in consideration of his giving
tip all right of any other lands than those demised, Belasyse
demised to Darnell, his executors, administrators, and assigns,
certain surface land containing about ninety-two acres, as the
same was then enclosed by Darnell. The exception was, the
mines and quarries lying and being within and under the same,
with full power and free liberty and power to sink for, win, and
work the same, with pit room and heap room for the same, and
with all liberties, privileges, and conveniences necessary and convenient for the winning, working, and management thereof; the
said William Belasyse, his heirs or assigns, paying to said William
Darnell, his executors, administrators, and assigns, the sum of 13s.
4d. for every coal-pit which he or they should sink within the
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demised premises; and saving and reserving full and free liberty
and authority for the said William Darnell, his executors, administrators, and assigns, to dig and take stones for and out of the
quarries within the said demised premises, for the building or
repairing of his or their houses, buildings, or works within the
said manor to be built, repaired, or erected; with free wayleave
and passage to, from, and along the same on foot or on horseback,
with all manner of carriages, always excepted and reserved to the
said William Belasyse, his heirs and assigns. To hold to said
Darnell, his executors, administrators, and assigns, for the term of
one thousand years at a nominal rent. The lease also contained
a covenant by the lessee that the lessor might cut, dig, sink, win,
work, take, lead, and carry away the said mines and quarries in
and from the said demised premises, with all liberties and privileges thereunto belonging, at the will and pleasure of the said
William Belasyse, his heirs or assigns, without the lawful let, suit,
trouble, or interruption of the said lessee. There was also a
covenant by said Belasyse that he, his executors and assigns, in
the winning and working the collieries within the said demised
premises, and in the leading away the coals from the same, and in
using the other liberties and privileges before excepted and
reserved to him, his heirs and assigns, would do as little damage
and spoil to the soil and herbage of the premises demised as he or
they could conveniently make or do.
The mines of coal under the demised premises had been worked,
and a way out for that purpose along the coal-seam, but not high
enough for the passage of carriages and horses, and therefore a
height of about eighteen inches was cut in the stone above the
roof of the mine to cure this defect.
It appeared by the evidence that the first injury and damage to
the surface took place in November 1862. In the year following
the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, which was,
however, compromised by an order to stay proceedings on payment of the amount of damage then done, this amount to be
assessed by an arbitrator. Th., arbitrator had made an award by
which he ordered the defendauts to pay the sum of 501., which
had been paid.
Afterwards the plaintiff, as he alleged, had become aware that
the defendants intended to proceed with the workiig of the seam of
coal under his land, without leaving sufficient support for the sur.
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face soil. The bill, therefore, also prayed for an injunction to
restrain the defendants from further working under his farm, or
any land adjacent thereto, in such a manner as to occasion a subsidence of the surface of the land, and also for damages for the
injury since the date of the award.
By their answer the defendants averred that they were entitled
to continue the workings under the plaintiff's farm and the land
adjacent, in the same manner as they had been doing, and they
believed they were working these mines in the county of Durham,
leaving the customary and usual support for the surface.
The effect of the other parts of the answer and evidence is
stated in the judgment.
Bolt, Q. C., Willeock, Q. C., and Taber, for the -plaintiff, contended that he was entitled to the relief as prayed. They cited:
Hunt v. Peate, Johns. 705; -Elliott v. .'orth-Bastern Bailway
Co., 10 H. L. Cases 833, 8 L. T. Rep. N. S. 337; Bonomi v.
Baekhouse, 9 H. L,. Cases 503, 4 L. T. Rep. N. S. 754; -Dugdale v. Robertson, 3 K. & J. 695 ; Hfilton v. Lord Granville, 5
Q. B. Rep. 701; Smart v. Morton, 5 E. & B. 30; Bowser v.
MifcLean, 2 De G. F. & J. 615, 3 L. T. Rep. N. S. 456; L;ewis
v. Braithwaite, 2 B. & Ad. 437; Barrow v. TVansittart, 1 Rail.
Cases 603 ; .Aorth--Eastern Bailway Co. v. Crossland, 2 J. & H.
565, 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 765.
Sir H. Cairns, Q. C., and Dickinson, for the defendants,
admitted that if injury was proved the plaintiff might be entitled
to compensation. They cited: Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. of
L. Oases 348, 2 L. T. Rep. N. S. 642; Isenberg v. East India
Hfouse -EstateCo., 9 L. T. Rep. N. S. 625; -Lloyd v. London,
Chatham, and -DoverBtailway Co., 11 Jur. N. S. 380.
Willeocl in reply.
YC
IE-CAN cELLOR WOOD said :-The question in this cause
arises on the demise for the term of one thousand years of the
surface land to the plaintiff [he here read the principal terms
of the lease before set out]; and the question is as to what
right the defendants have to the use of any portion of the
underground property as a wayleave, and as to their right to work
the mine in such a manner as may occasion damage to the lessee
of the surface land. Now the exception in the lease is a peculiar
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one; but he did not think there was really any substantial diffi
culty on the whole construction of the lease, looking at the attendant circumstances and collecting what it is that the lessor has
reserved to himself. He was lord of the manor, making a lease
of an enclosed part of the manor, and being owner of all the mines
in the manor as such lord, he excepts out of the demise the whole
of the mines. N'ow, whether the word " mines" be used as it
often was in the sense of minerals, the thing dug out of the mine
or that which contains the minerals, that which contains cannot be
less than the thing contained-and therefore there is no doubt
that the whole containing chamber which has the minerals is " the
mine," and so far as the ihines are concerned there can be no
question that they are altogether out of the demise; and as to
them the representatives of the lessor are of course entitled to
use them for any purpose whatsoever, and at any period. Lord
CAMPBELL'S decision in the cause of Bowser v. lJHLean, u6i
supra, in this court completely explains what the right view is.
He says: " With regard to copyholds the copyholder has the
whole right in him, but subject to the right of the lord to work
the mines, and the lord cannot use an underground way for the
purpose of passing through any portion of the copyhold premises.
But as regards that which is excepted out of a demise by contract,
of course the owner can use whatever he excepts in any way he
may think fit." As regards that part of the case he never had
any doubt. The only question that can be raised is about that
headway of eighteen inches for the use of carriages and horses:
whether the lessors are entitled to demand a wayleave in respect
of it. Perhaps no such intention could have existed, but we must
collect the intention from the lease itself. A right issuing out of
the property cannot be excepted, for you either demise the whole
of the property or not. If you do demise the whole of the property, and except anything, then it is by way of regrant, as in
the case of hawking and hunting, which was much discussed in
two cases, in which all the learning on the subject was collected:
viz., Wickham v. H~awker, 7 M. & W. 78, and -Doe v. Lock, 2
A. & E. 705, which he conceived decided that this was not a
reservation of the whole, ownership in that sense, but a grant, as
it were, to be taken out of the property demised, and the question
is, what is the extent of that grant which the landlord has so
insisted on ? Is it a grant merely for the purpose of working
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these parties' mines, or has he insisted on a grant giving him an
absolute right to this use for any purpose whatsoever ? As far as
the words go, it is for any purpose whatsoever. There is no limitation, and furthermore it is to be considered, that the first
exception of the mines would give him the restricted right of
working them without any words whatsoever. That was determined in the case of Lord Cardiganv. Armitage, 2 B. & (.197,
where it was held, that when once you reserve mines you reserve
everything that is necessary for working them. See qoold v.
Great Western -Deep Coal Co. (Limited), 12 L. T. Rep. N. S.
842. This of course includes the wayleave for carrying away
the minerals, especially when you find, as he did here, the words
4Cwith power to win and work the same." That is one ground for
supposing that when it is expressed as it is in the present case it
is not intended to be restricted to the limited right. You have
also the circumstances of the grant. You find the landlord, who
has the property in the whole manor, excepting the right to the
mines ; and the intent of the parties that what is here expressed
to be absolute is confirmed by the fact that he has reserved to
himself the full, complete, and absolute right of going through
this property with carriages and horses for any purpose which he
may think fit. As to that part of the case, therefore, the plaintiff's bill must be dismissed with costs. As to the other part of
the case, the right of the lessor so to work these mines which are
reserved as not to let down the soil, this is clearly governed by
the authorities and followed in Dugdale v. )?obertson, ubi supra.
The case comes to this: whenever a person demises the surface, he
primd facie intends to uphold the surface, in order that he may
not derogate from his own grant. He cannot do any act which
will let that surface down, and although he reserves to himself the
mines, and all liberties and privileges of working them, he does
not include the right of so working them as to destroy them.
That is a right which the lessee of the surface has obtained for
himself and will not be deprived of by mere implication arising on
conjecture from the lease, but there must be a plain, clear, and
distinct indication of such intent. The Vice-Chancellor then stated
the circumstances of the case of BZowbotham v. Wilson, ubi supra.
Here the words are only that Belasyse, his heirs and assigns, are
to be at liberty to "cut, dig, sink, win, work, take, lead, and
carry away the mines and quarries in and from the demised
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premises, with all liberties and privileges thereunto belonging."
These words standing alone cannot be held to have the effect of
enabling him to carry away everything, whatever the consequences
might be. The other clause, which had been much relied on, was
that Belasyse in leading away the coal "would do as little damage
-and spoil to the soil as he could conveniently make or do." He
did not, however, think that a clause restricting the right of the
lessor could be raised into any implication enabling him to destroy
that privilege which he had conferred, viz., the surface in its
existing state, to be used in its existing state with all the benefits
that every surface-owner has, unless he has distinctly contracted
himself out of his right. As to the question whether there has
been any letting down of the surface soil, there does not seem to
be much dispute on the evidence; but that would not prevent the
plaintiff having a decree. There is a distinct assertion of the
right. What he should do would, under all the circumstances of
the case, be, to dismiss the bill with costs as far as regards the
relief sought by the two first paragraphs of the prayer, and then
to restrain the defendants, according to the third paragraph,
"from working in such a manner as to occasion any further subsidence or alteration of the surface of the land," with an inquiry
whether the plaintiff had sustained any and what damage in
respect of the working of the defendants other than that which
has been compensated by the terms of the former award. Upon
that part of the case the plaintiff must have his costs; the one
set of costs to be set off against the other.
Decree accordingly.

Court of Admiralty.
THE HELEN.
In a suit upon an agreement contemplating a breach of blockade of the ports of
the Confederate States of America, and upon a motion to strike out the fourth
article of the defendant's answer which pleaded that such agreement was not bind.
ing by reason of a breach of blockade being illegal,
Held, that a breach of blockade by neutrals is not an offence against the municipal
law of this counrry.
Ordinarily, decisions of the H. of L. and the P. C. and the Courts of Common
Law are absolutely binding upon the Court of Admiralty.
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Brett, Q. C., and B. C. Clarkson, for plaintiff.
Ailward, Q. C., and Pritchard,for-defendant.

The facts of this case sufficiently appear in the judgment. In
the argument the following cases were referred to: Santissima
Trinidad, 7 Wheat. Rep. 340; Richardson v. The Marine
Insurance Co., 6 Mass. Rep. 113; Seaton, Maitland & Co. v
Low, 1 Johns. Rep.; Arnould 763, 764, 766, 773; 3 Kent',

Com. 367 ; 2 Parsons 95 ; Phillips, c. 3, s. 2, 163 ; Marshall 37;
Maud & Pollock 309; 2 Twiss 297.
DR. LuSHINGTON.-This is a motion by the plaintiff to reject
the fourth article of the defendant's answer. The parties in this
cause arc John Andrews Wardell, formerly the master of the
Hfelen, plaintiff; and the Albion Trading Company, the owners
of the ship, defendants. The master sues for wages, with certain
premiums added, alleged to have been earned between July 1864
and March 1865. The answer states that, according to the agreement as set forth by the defendants, the plaintiff has been paid all
that was due to him. This part of the answer is not objected to.
The fourth and last article is the one objected to. It alleges that
the agreement was entered into for the purpose of breaking the
blockade of the Southern States of America; that such an agree.
ment is contrary to law, and cannot be enforced by this court. In
the course of the argument, the judgment recently delivered by
Lord WESTBURY whilst he was Lord Chancellor, in Ex parte
Chavasse, 6 N. R. 26, was cited as governing the case. The law
there laid down is briefly stated, that a contract of partnership in
blockade running is not contrary to the municipal law of this
country; and by the decree the partnership was declared valid,
and the accounts ordered accordingly. It was admitted that this
decision is directly applicable to the present case. A decision of
the Lord Chancellor is to be treated by the court with the greatest
respect; but is it absolutely binding? Decisions of the following
tribunals are absolutely binding upon the Court of Admiralty, viz.
the House of Lords, the Privy Council, and, when deciding upon
the construction of a statute, the courts of common law. All,
then, that this court has to do, is to inquire if such decision is
applicable to the case before it. If so, then it is the duty of the
court to obey whatever may be its own judgment. On the present
occasion no decision has been cited from the House of Lords, the
'VOL. XIV.-12
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Privy Council, or the courts of common law.

But, as an intima-

tion has been given that this case will be carried to the Judicial
Committee, that tribunal might be inclined to consider me remiss
in my duty if I had omitted to form an independent judgment on
the case, and to state my reasons for so doing. It is, I conceive,
admitted on all hands that the court must enforce the agreement
with the master unless it is satisfied that such agreement is illegal
by the municipal law of Great Britain. In order to prove this
proposition, the defendants say that the agreement to break the
blockade by a neutral ship is on the part of all parties concerned
illegal according to the law of nations, which is a part of the
municipal law of this country; ergo, this contract is illegal by
municipal law. Now, a good deal may depend on the sense in
which the word " illegal" is used. I am. strongly inclined to
think that the defendants attach to it a more extensive meaning
than it can properly bear, or was intended to bear by those who
used it. The true meaning, I think, is that all such contracts are
illegal so far, that if carried out they would lead to acts which
might under certain circumstances expose the parties concerned
to such penal consequences as are sanctioned by international law
for breach of blockade or for the carrying of contraband. If so,
the illegality is of a limited character. For instance, suppose a
vessel, after breaking the blockade, completes her voyage home,
and is afterwards seized on another voyage, the original taint of
illegality, whatever it may have been, is purged, and the ship
cannot be condemned; yet if the voyage was ab initio wholly and
absolutely illegal both by the law of nations and the municipal
law, why should the successful termination purge the offence ? Let
me consider the relative situation of the parties. A neutral
country has a right to trade with other countries in time of peace.
One of these countries becomes a belligerent and is blockaded.
Why should the rights of the neutral be affected by the acts of
the other belligerent ? The answer of the blockading power is,
"1Mine is a just and necessary war ;" a matter which in ordinary
cases a neutral cannot question. The belligerent further says,
"I must seize contraband. I must enforce blockade to carry on
the war." In this state of things there has been a long and
admitted usage on the part of all civilized states, a concession by
both parties-the belligerent and neutral-an universal usage
which constitutes the law of nations. It is only with reference U
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this usage that the belligerent can interfere with the neutral.
Suppose no question of blockade or contraband, no belligerent
could claim a right of seizure on the high seas of a neutral vessel
going to the port of another belligerent, however essential to his
interest it might be so to do. What is the usage as to blockade ?
There are several conditions to be observed in order to justify the
seizure of a ship. Amongst other things the blockade must be
effective, and, save accidental interruption by weather, constantly
enforced. The neutral vessel must be taken in delicto. The
blockade must be enforced against all nations alike, including the
belligerent one. When all the necessary conditions are satisfied,
then by the law of nations the belligerent is allowed to capture
and condemn neutral vessels without remonstrance from the
neutral state. It never has been a part of admitted common
usage that such voyages should be deemed illegal by the neutral
state, still less that the neutral state should be bound to prevent
them. The belligerent has not a shadow of right to require more
than universal usage has given him, amongst which is not included
the power to say to the neutral, "1You shall help me to enforce
my belligerent right by curtailing your own freedom of commerce,
and making that illegal by your own law which was not so before."
This doctrine is not inconsistent with the maxim that the law of
nations is part of the law of this.country. The fact is, the law
of nations has never declared that a neutral state is bound to
impede or diminish its own trade by municipal restriction; for our
own Foreign Enlistment Act is itself a proof that, to constitute
transactions between British subjects when neutrals and belligerents a municipal offence by the law of Great Britain a statute was
necessary. If the acts mentioned in that statute were in themselves a violation of municipal law, why any statute at all? I am
now speaking of fitting out ships of war; not of levying soldierm,
which stands upon a different footing. I may here say, that in
principle there is no essential difference whether the question of
breach of municipal law is raised with regard to contraband or
breach of blockade. Then how stands the case upon authority ?
Ar. Duer is the only text-writer who maintains an opinion contrary
to what I have stated to be the law. He maintains it with much
ability and acuteness, but he stands alone. He, however, admits
that an insurance of a contraband cargo is no offence against the
municipal law of a neutral country according to the practice of all

